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JPRS Report

West Europe

2 NOVEMBER 1987

WEST EUROPE

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KKE POLITICAL BUREAU REPORT ADMONISHES PARTY ORGAN

35210188a Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 30-31 Aug 87 p 1

/Text/ The newspaper organ of the KKE Central Committee that was the subject of yesterday's meeting of the political bureau is still on the center stage of the KKE's party developments. It is to be noted that the communist party leadership's problems with regard to the course being followed by RIZOSPASTIS are tied in with the particularly sensitive issue of deviations from fundamental party options that recently resulted in significant but "mute" intra-party "friction" with regard to the existence of "two lines" within the party.

The KKE Political Bureau estimates that the central committee's journal, managed by Deputy Grigoris Farakos who is also member of the KKE Political Bureau, continues to show weaknesses in the ideological and political fields.

The political bureau also notes that "errors damaging the credibility of the newspaper are not lacking and they are basically due to a lack of vigilance and attention."

Also pointed out is that "it ineffectually presents the correct and vital cooperation of RIZOSPASTIS with party organizations but also with mass organizations of the people." Subsequently noted is that "much can and must still be done in the direction of an all-out and in-depth assimilation of the party line by RIZOSPASTIS' associates, in the direction of a greater exigency of every communist who works on the party newspaper." A basic finding of the political bureau is that RIZOSPASTIS "measures up to a great extent to the current needs of the party and the mass movement."

Although this is not the first time the KKE Political Bureau comes out critically against the newspaper--organ of the party's central committee--the above facts acquire special significance because they are coming at a time when the conflict of views and lines at the party's top leadership echelon is in a process of developing. Reliable evidence of a different viewpoint was shown in the somewhat ambiguous stance of the newspaper in confronting developments taking place in the Soviet Union. More specifically, it was observed that some of RIZOSPASTIS' "openings"--through reportage, analyses and facts about the intrigues in the USSR--either did not have continuity or were balanced out with "discreet" texts not too particularly enthusiastic over Mr Gorbachev's "initiatives."

POLL RESULTS ON PUBLIC'S STANCE ON CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

35210188b Athens ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 24 Aug 87 pp 24-25

/Report by Petros Makris/

/Text/ A total of 54 percent of the inhabitants of Athens, Piraeus and surrounding areas want the separation of church and state. At the same time, 66 percent prefer the distribution of monastic lands directly to farmers, while 58 percent do not want a return of our autocephalous church to the Constantinople Patriarchate.

At the same time, 48 percent consider "not much or not at all satisfactory" the manner in which the government handled the crisis over relations with the church, while an equally large percentage (47 percent) described this manner as "very or quite satisfactory."

Finally, 71 percent criticized the church over the manner in which it handled the recent crisis in its relations with the state, specifically with the present government.

The above revealing facts, that show the shattering of confidence of both "devout" and non-devout toward the Greek Orthodox Church hierarchy, ensue from a recent EURODIM poll that will prove to be a rather useful tool for a better exercise of the role of our church and for the establishment of a more structured form of social cooperation with the state.

The separation of those questioned into age groups, in party preferences and in "devout" or "non-devout" and often not at all "churchgoing" render the results and conclusions of the survey more objective and revealing.

Those in an older age bracket, holding conservative views and with religious formalism coincide with or rather support the positions of our church's hierarchy.

Thus, with regard to the issue of the separation of church and state, those agreeing are in the following age brackets: 18-24 (58 percent), 25-34 (66 percent), 35-49 (52 percent) and 50-64 (50 percent).

On the other hand, 41 percent of those 65 years and older agree to the separation of church and state, while 46 percent disagree.

The 66 percent that favor separation (the 25-34 age group) usually represents an equally large percentage of citizens who find in the church a sort of support and comfort in their daily tribulations.

Regardless of the political beliefs that differentiate the position of the citizen vis-a-vis the clergy hierarchy, we have the difference of age that in the name of religious discord leads to a sort of generation conflict.

Also impressive is the percentage (59 percent) of "devout and non-devout churchgoing persons" who want the separation of church and state, while even in the ranks of the politically conservative groups (ND), 42 percent are for and 49 percent against separation, while 9 percent do not take any position.

Church Property

Surprising in the overall survey are the percentages that do not show confidence in the handling of church property by the state but would have wanted church property to be distributed directly to farmers (overall 66 percent of those queried).

Of interest here is the political dimension of the overall issue. In PASOK ranks--that proposed the state's assumption of the handling of the matter--47 percent prefer the direct distribution of monastic property to farmers. Even the KKE's communists, who supposedly would have preferred, in the name of Marxism-Leninism, state intervention with regard to monastic property, voted 51 percent in favor of direct distribution of such property to farmers.

Thus, parallel to the controversy over the ecclesiastical establishment we also have the rejection of the government and bureaucratic establishment by those same (supposedly) followers of statism.

Of particular interest are those facts in the poll that "grade" the conduct of the PASOK government and the current church hierarchy in their recent conflict.

The percentage of those disagreeing or agreeing with the government's strategy is divided almost in two (47 percent for and 48 percent against the government's handling of matters. The 5 percent did not take any position).

Impressive too is the 50 percent of those 65 years of age and over who consider the government's handling of matters "very or quite satisfactory." This fact bears witness to the fact that even the age of the supposedly religious formalists doubt the "authenticity" of the clergy hierarchy.

Finally, overwhelming also was the percentage of ND followers (41 percent) and older persons (57 percent) who believe that in its recent fight with the state the clergy hierarchy made many clumsy mistakes. Even more overwhelming are the PASOK and KKE figures (from 91!) who did not remain satisfied with the way the crisis was handled by the church.

Concluding our report on the results of the poll we must make clear that the term church used by EURODIM evidently refers to the hierarchy of the Greek Orthodox Church clergy and not to our "church people."

Table 1

Some presently maintain that it would be better for both the church and state if there were to be a separation of church and state. Do you agree or disagree with this?

	Agree	Disagree	No Answer
	%	%	%
Overall	54	37	9
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	58	33	9
25-34	66	28	6
35-49	52	40	8
50-64	50	40	10
65 and over	41	46	13
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	43	46	11
Devout and occasional churchgoing	46	45	9
Devout and non-churchgoing	59	33	8
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	63	29	8
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	74	22	4
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	42	49	9
PASOK	58	34	8
KKE	77	18	5

Table 2

As you know, the Chamber of Deputies recently passed a law regarding church property and church administration. In principle, this law provides for giving monastic property to the state that will, in turn, grant its use to cooperatives. What is your opinion on this?

	Do you agree?	Do you find it preferable to have it given directly to farmers?	No Answer
Overall	29	66	5
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	26	71	3
25-34	29	66	5
35-49	34	61	5
50-64	25	69	6
65 and over	29	62	9

Table 2 (continued)

	Do you agree?	Do you find it preferable to have it given directly to farmers?	No Answer
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	13	77	10
Devout and occasional churchgoing	29	57	4
Devout and non-churchgoing	31	64	5
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	42	56	2
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	43	55	2
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	5	88	7
PASOK	51	47	2
KKE	45	51	4

Table 3

This law also provides for changes in church administration with which the church does not agree. From what you have heard, what is your opinion on these changes?

	Do you agree?	Disagree?	No Answer
Overall	46	36	18
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	51	29	20
25-34	53	28	19
35-49	45	37	18
50-64	39	46	15
65 and over	42	39	19
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	24	54	22
Devout and occasional churchgoing	48	38	14
Devout and non-churchgoing	52	35	13
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	58	23	19
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	67	18	15
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	13	73	14
PASOK	70	16	14
KKE	71	14	15

Table 4

If the government finally insists on these changes in church administration, do you think that the church should ask for the abrogation of its autocephalous status and return to the Constantinople Patriarchate?

	Yes	No	No Answer
Overall	25	58	17
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	19	64	17
25-34	22	60	18
35-49	26	61	13
50-64	33	49	18
65 and over	20	52	28
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	35	44	21
Devout and occasional churchgoing	29	59	12
Devout and non-churchgoing	21	54	25
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	15	70	15
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	15	63	17
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	51	33	16
PASOK	14	74	12
KKE	9	72	19

Table 5

In your opinion, the manner in which the government handled the crisis in its relations with the church was:

	Very or quite satisfactory	Slightly or not at all satisfactory	No Answer
Overall	47	48	5
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	46	49	5
25-34	49	47	4
35-49	48	48	4
50-64	42	55	3
65 and over	50	37	13
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	29	66	5
Devout and occasional churchgoing	52	45	3
Devout and non-churchgoing	55	42	3
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	59	37	4
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	52	42	6

Table 5 (continued)

	Very or quite satisfactory	Slightly or not at all satisfactory	No Answer
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	13	86	1
PASOK	77	22	1
KKE	59	35	6

Table 6

And what is your opinion on how the church handled the crisis?

	Very or quite satisfactory	Slightly or not at all satisfactory	No Answer
Overall	23	71	6
<u>Age</u>			
18-24	18	75	7
25-34	12	85	3
35-49	25	70	5
50-64	32	65	3
65 and over	31	57	12
<u>Religiousness</u>			
Devout and often churchgoing	43	49	8
Devout and occasional churchgoing	23	73	4
Devout and non-churchgoing	16	82	2
Non-devout and occasional churchgoing	14	83	3
Non-devout and non-churchgoing	6	88	6
<u>Party Voted For in 1985</u>			
ND	57	41	2
PASOK	7	91	2
KKE	6	91	3

Note: As stated by EURODIM, the poll was conducted as follows: "The poll was conducted between 22 and 31 May 1987. A sample made up of 600 persons living in Athens, Piraeus and the surrounding areas was selected on the basis of the quota method by sex, age, region and electoral district so that all categories of the population might be proportionally represented. This method that EURODIM uses exclusively in Greece ensures the best possible representativeness of the sample."

ELECTION EXPERT EXAMINES REASONS FOR PROGRESS PARTY'S RISE

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 87 p 5

[Article by Finn Langeland: "Hagen Shatters Political Pattern"; passage in slantlines in italics in original]

[Text] "It is an oversimplification to view the Progress Party as an ultra-conservative party. During its strongest periods, the Progress Party has been characterized by the adoption of attitudes and standpoints which run directly athwart the traditional liberal-conservative axis," points out Hilmar Rommetvedt of Rogaland Research to AFTENPOSTEN.

He reminds us of the voter switchover from the Labor Party to the Progress Party during the fall elections. "And this is something which happens after Carl I. Hagen has twice helped see to it that Gro Harlem Brundtland was assured the post of prime minister."

Progress Party's Connection

Rommetvedt believes that Carl I. Hagen's political "stroke of genius" was the connection he made between immigrants and asylum seekers, on the one hand, and the elderly and the sick, on the other.


"Just before the year's elections, many voters have probably interpreted the situation to be one in which it is the elderly and the sick who must suffer because of immigrants and asylum seekers."

Uncertain Voters

Rommetvedt stresses that a few days before the elections a great many voters did not know which party they would vote for.

"In other words, it was still possible to influence the voters. And to all appearances, that was precisely what happened. The voters /were/ influenced during the final spurt of the election campaign. It appears that from September 7 to September 10 the Labor Party lost nearly three percentage points, while the Progress Party gained an equal amount."

The graph shows that in the collapse of the nonsocialist parties Carl I. Hagen won at the expense of the Conservative Party and that he won the immigrant debate in the election campaign's final phase at the expense of the Labor Party. For its part, the Conservative Party lost votes because of the intense squabble over taxes at a time when the party was about to win back part of what it had lost in June/July.



According to Rommetvedt, the Conservative Party was affected only slightly by crossover voters during the last few days before the elections. In the August polls, the party's support had stabilized after a decline of three percentage points immediately following the abortive attempt to form a new nonsocialist government in June.

Tax Blunder

Rommetvedt feels that the disagreement between Rolf Presthus and Arne Rettedal over tax policy contributed strongly to the Conservative Party's catastrophically poor showing in the elections. As a result of the blunder committed at the start of the election campaign, the Conservative Party leaders had to put in a lot of time and effort trying to explain things. And internal discord is always of dubious value to a political party.

"At the moment there is just one poll available of the people's party choice at the beginning of September, but the main trend seems clear: Conservative Party support declined by nearly two percentage points, while Progress Party support increased by a corresponding amount and then some. Nor did the mud-slinging and death threats against Carl I. Hagen do anything to lessen sympathy for the Progress Party," notes Rommetvedt, a political scientist.

Labor Party Lost

Right after the government crisis in June, the Labor Party received increased support in the opinion polls. The party emerged as the only realistic alternative for forming a government. But as early as the August polls, the party had lost this advantage.

Rommetvedt thinks that the Norwegian Labor Federation's severe criticism of the interest rate can explain why the Labor Party suffered another setback in the opinion polls. "Most people had probably expected the Progress Party to increase its support at the expense of the Conservative Party, but the Progress Party's success was greater than anticipated," observes Rommetvedt.

"To a large degree, politics is also a question of defining reality. The party that succeeds in persuading people its appraisal of the situation is correct has gained a lot," he says and emphasizes that the Progress Party's appeal to feelings of decency toward the elderly and the sick, and its skepticism about immigrants and asylum seekers, together contributed significantly to the party's advance. And Rommetvedt warns:

"If the other parties overlook these things, many of them run the risk of committing strategic errors which can only help strengthen the Progress Party's position."

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CSO: 3639/1

POLL SHOWS SLIGHT RISE IN VOTERS SATISFIED WITH GOVERNMENT

Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian 21 Sep 87 p 5

[Article by Hans Chr. Erlandsen: "Most People Satisfied With Government"]

[Text] Altogether 44 percent of the voters are satisfied with the government's performance, according to an opinion poll conducted by the Norwegian Gallup Institute for AFTENPOSTEN in August. This is somewhat better approval than the government had in May of this year, before the collapse of the nonsocialist coalition, when 43 percent said they were satisfied.

There are also more people dissatisfied with the government's performance: 41 percent in November, as opposed to 39 percent in May. In the opinion poll for August, 14 percent did not know what to reply, as opposed to 18 percent in May.

Last Year 53 Percent

The question asked was this: "Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance thus far?" In March of last year, the final opinion poll for the Willoch government showed that 53 percent were satisfied, while 39 percent were dissatisfied.

At 51 percent, people in the south and west appear to be most satisfied. The government receives least approval, 38 percent, in northern Norway and the Trondelag counties. We find most of the dissatisfied voters in the three big cities--Oslo, Bergen, and Trondheim--and in Akershus county, where 46 percent of those asked replied that they were not satisfied with the government's performance.

More Popular Among Married Couples

Like previous surveys, this last opinion poll also shows that the government is more popular among married couples than among cohabitants. Satisfaction sinks, moreover, as income rises. The opinion poll demonstrates that Labor Party constituents think most highly (75 percent) of the government's performance, while Conservative Party backers are the most displeased: 21 percent are satisfied, while 70 percent are dissatisfied.

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CSO: 3639/1

DETAILS ON BACKGROUND, ORGANIZATION OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

35480112 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 23 Aug 87 pp 10-11

[Article by Carlos Yarnoz]

[Text] A. de la I., baron of Penafiel, a former officer of the Nomadic Troops and today an army commander, lives in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. A tall, bald, neatly attired man with a large moustache, he spends his time raising camels. Many days he can be seen in a "jaima," or large tent that he owns. He is the CESID [Superior Center of Defense Intelligence] man in that north African country. A few months ago, Gen Emilio Alonso Manglano, the CESID director, remarked at the Defense Ministry: "Our collaborators range from princes to gangsters." From investigating large fortunes to collaborating with terrorists, as happened last year in Madrid, CESID agents, the government's antennas, seek information because information means power. Their motto says it all: "Knowledge to conquer."

In May of last year in Madrid police arrested 10 members of a strange terrorist group named The Call of Jesus Christ. Among them were the Lebanese brothers Faisal and Danny Hanny Joudi. Some months later it was learned that some of the arrested individuals had collaborated with CESID agents, with whom they had held several meetings. The contacts took place after the Joudi brothers had told the Spanish agents that they were prepared to furnish information on terrorist activities in exchange for large amounts of money.

The offer had been made previously to the secret services of France and the United States. The French swallowed the bait and began paying them. The Americans seemed to be thinking it over. The Spaniards sounded out the two Lebanese brothers, eventually lending them some sort of aid. They met with them at several apartments that the two were making use of in Madrid. The meetings were even videotaped by the agents, who later analyzed them thoroughly.

On 2 May the police nabbed Spanish citizen Victor Becerra and Portuguese citizen Victor Manuel Romano as they were planting a bomb at a Bank of America branch on Capitan Haya Street in Madrid. During a subsequent interrogation the arrested men confessed that they had been recruited by the Joudi brothers to carry out such attacks around Europe and that they had been involved in the 11 April bombing of an Air France office in Lisbon. They were planning to

collect 10.5 million pesetas at the Libyan Embassy, whose connections with the Jouidi brothers were verified, for the bomb attacks in Lisbon and Madrid.

The CESID men were terribly disillusioned. The police searched the apartments used by the arrested men, inside which CESID had planted microphones and cameras. The police did not find them, and the CESID agents had to keep watch for days in order to secretly penetrate the buildings and recover their equipment without being discovered.

The "Madrid Command"

Terrorism is not an area of special concern to CESID, although it has achieved a number of successes in it. Officials at the center assert that it was prominently involved in the arrest of the "Madrid Command" of ETA's military wing this past 16 January. Tiny devices that emit radio signals were attached to suspicious cars to follow the trail of the ETA members.

In addition, a Civil Guard captain stationed in Pamplona and attached to CESID secured information that led to the arrest of the "Nafarroa Command." The captain, the son of a Civil Guard general, learned through a "mole" residing in southern France that a resident of Pamplona was receiving money from ETA and had rented an office. The office was kept under surveillance for months until concrete leads to the command were obtained.

These sporadic incursions into the field of terrorism aside, what really has CESID worried at the moment is the arms trafficking from Spain, as private and public enterprises are engaged in incredible three-way transactions with Iran or Iraq. "That really is a dangerous world, and unfortunately we have little information on them," says one of the sources consulted in CESID.

The center's close to 1,800 members are distributed into 7 areas. The intelligence area is subdivided into domestic intelligence, with its headquarters at 5 Castellana Boulevard [paseo], and external intelligence, whose headquarters is on Vitrubio Street, specifically on the lower floors of the Defense Staff building.

The counterintelligence area, known as "la contra," was on Menendez Pelayo Street last year but has now been transferred to another building on Goya Street. The economy and technology division, which is devoted specially to industrial counterespionage, has signed agreements with more than 120 high-tech firms to safeguard information. The other areas are administration and services, personnel (including the training school) and operational support.

The Secret Area

The operational support area or command is the most interesting but also the most secret. Its agents, some 300 of them, are the only ones who use false first and last names, while the rest use their real first name and only change their surnames; however, the first letter of the real and false surnames is the same.

To some members of operational support, no door or lock is too tough for their talents, nor is any conversation unrecordable. The technology that they have available, some of which they themselves manufacture, is the most advanced in the world, and much of it cannot be found on the most sophisticated market. From cameras with lenses mounted on filaments that can be passed through walls to laser-technology directional microphones that can pick up conversations through a meter and a half of cement. They have no headquarters or base; instead, they are scattered around apartments, small shops or businesses that are used as covers. "They often operate completely outside the law," acknowledges an individual who is quite familiar with this complex world; he says that the agents feel the need for a statute that sets forth their limitations and areas of responsibility.

Antennas on the World

In external intelligence there are divisions for Latin America, the Arab countries, Eastern Europe and Western Europe. The latter division has some 30 "antennas," or agents, spread around the world, although greater interest is shown in the countries of northern Africa.

The conditions under which CESID agents operate abroad depends on relations between Spain and the country of their assignment. In the case of a friendly country, the CESID man is sent there with the knowledge of the local government. This is the case with the baron of Penafiel in Mauritania. Concurrently, countries that are regarded as friends have spies in Spain with the knowledge of the Spanish Government, and there is often collaboration with them in the exchange of intelligence or the technical systems to be employed. Thus, known members of the Mossad, the Israeli spy agency, reside in Spain and cooperate with CESID. The Mossad, for example, partly controls a services company on the Costa del Sol that offers valets, chauffeurs or cleaning personnel for local bigwigs, such as Arab sheiks.

The intelligence services work together closely in other aspects as well. For example, there is a listening center in Almeria at which 24 hours a day Italian and Spanish technicians intercept messages from ships or submarines sailing the Mediterranean. In Manzanares (Ciudad Real) there is another much more important listening center, most of whose installations are under ground, at which expert agents from Spain and the FRG work. Listening posts such as these can intercept messages between embassies, transmissions from other spies or electronic signals from military ships and aircraft.

Foreign intelligence agents can also take up residence in a given country under diplomatic cover.

The cultural attache in a certain Balkan country is a CESID military commander who is the son of an army general. Commander Juan Martinez, who was also a cultural attache, had to leave Libya in May of last year after the government of Muammar al-Qadhafi gave him 10 days to return to Spain. Alonso Manglano himself sent a telex ordering the agent to return before the deadline owing to the danger that he could have been in given the full-fledged crisis in relations between the two countries.

A third status for foreign agents is called a station. In this case the spy is placed in the appropriate country in the guise of a merchant, lawyer, pilot or whatever job is deemed most opportune. If they are discovered, they have to defend themselves as best they can on their own. In the USSR, for example, a certain woman is in this position. In Mauritania, near the border with the Sahara, such an agent is in charge of staying in touch with the Polisario. They customarily transmit their reports over the radio, albeit in code and through systems that distort the waves.

Agents of all three types are found in the countries of northern Africa. This is CESID's most heavily worked area. In Rabat, the previous officer, S. de la P., did cartographic work and made maps of the Sahara, among other activities, in the 1970's (the maps were then handed over to the Moroccan Government); he has recently been replaced by the military commander F.F.O. Another military commander stationed as an agent in Rabat has a daughter in CESID who is assigned to Madrid. In Casablanca, a civilian agent with relatives in the army is in charge of monitoring the port under diplomatic cover. There is another station in Nador.

The agent in Tunis was a military officer who had smooth contacts with Palestinian organizations and is now in Jordan. He has been replaced by another military man. In Algeria, CESID missions are performed by a military commander, and in Libya, sources of information agree, the Spanish secret service has been left without agents.

But if northern Africa is an especially sensitive area for CESID, Ceuta and Melilla and the surrounding areas are obviously the hottest spots. Both towns, especially Melilla, have been a center of attraction for Spanish, Moroccan, American, Israeli and other agents over the past year.

CESID's men in Melilla operate under the supervision of Colonel E.A., although the post was held until last year by a lower-ranking officer. CESID's headquarters in the city is located on the first floor of an old building on General Polavieja Street. The same colonel and some of his men, guards and military personnel above all, are continually crossing the border to observe military maneuvers or to hold meetings of interest. For their part, the chief of the Moroccan secret services in northern Africa, Col Mohamed Kaddur, is seen practically every day around Melilla, as was his predecessor, whose surname was Yamani.

Spain's intelligence work in Melilla is conducted by CESID, the Civil Guard, the second section of the military headquarters, the police and, for several months now, the men of Gen Andres Cassinello, many of them active-duty or reserve military officers. Cassinello is the current general commander of Ceuta and a leading expert in intelligence services, of which he became chief in the thick of the democratic transition.

Foreign intelligence for State security also arrives through another channel that is controlled by the military as well: the military attaches at Spanish embassies. There are currently 68 attaches at 27 embassies. They come directly under the chief of staff of defense, Lt Gen Gonzalo Puigcerver, to whom they send their reports, which are not monitored by the ambassador.

Contrary to what one might think, the level of cooperation between military attaches and members of CESID is very low, mainly owing to mutual mistrust.

Obsession With Journalists

One of the daily tasks performed by CESID agents in Spain is to surveil journalists. Some agents acknowledge that there is a veritable obsession with ascertaining journalists' sources of information, with finding out which individuals in which ministries disclose data. To achieve their goal they do not hesitate to surveil professional newsmen, record their conversations, photograph them at their meetings and thoroughly analyze the articles they publish.

More than a few journalists have seen concrete evidence that intelligence agents were spying on them. This circumstance compounds the problem that the Defense Ministry, which CESID is under, has been minimally forthcoming with information in recent years.

During the training course one of the questions that candidate agents must answer is what newsmen they know. Once they have joined CESID, they will be told that they are expressly prohibited from talking with professional press people. If they do so without authorization, they are automatically expelled.

CESID claims that during its surveillance of newsmen it has discovered that several professional journalists receive periodic amounts of money, in foreign bank accounts, in exchange for more or less confidential information.

A New Home for Spies

CESID's internal organization is scattered today over numerous offices and centers that make its objectives more difficult to achieve. A new headquarters is currently being built for the agency at kilometer 8,800 of the La Coruna highway, a project for which the government approved a budget of 2.5 billion pesetas in 1985. The five-story building will house the main offices of the divisions, with the exception of the operational support command, which will remain decentralized in apartments or shops because of its "delicate" missions.

There will also be a training school for agents in the new building. From 1983 to the present, 1,500 candidates have taken part in the 8 selection courses that have been held. The ones chosen have then moved on to the present school, located on Castellana Boulevard in Madrid, where a well-known newsman for a national daily has even taught classes. There are attorneys, economists and sociologists among the candidates selected, some 200 of whom are women.

Candidates with advanced degrees are automatically placed at the rank of directors (identified internally by emblems with the letter D). Other lower ranks are aides (AY), administrators (AD), auxiliaries (AX), intelligence technicians (TI) or translators (TR). The directors are military officers from the military academy or civilians with university degrees. Aides are

military personnel on the auxiliary scale, who did not attend the academy, or specialists.

At most only 30 percent of the members of CESID are civilians, but practically all of them are the children or brothers and sisters of military officers. The women who are hired work primarily in administration, but every day more and more of them move into operational missions. For example, Lourdes M.C. was arrested in April 1984 along with two military officers and a guard as they were returning by train from Burdeos, where they had been on a secret mission.

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COMMENTARY ON POSSIBLE 'TURKISH ISLAMIC REPUBLIC'

35540298 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 20 Jul 87 p 9

[Commentary by Talat Halman]

[Text] Let us suppose that one day our country becomes a "Turco-Islamic republic!" Do not dismiss it out of hand. The "Islamic movement," which is receiving huge amounts of outside financial support, has lately become a giant force. What if the momentum created by that force is combined with the presence of a government to the right of ANAP in religious matters...You will probably say: "The Turkish military is Atatürkist, it is secular, it will not allow a theocratic state to be established." But, one day, the military may be headed by commanders unsympathetic to secularism, and, for external or internal reasons, may have chosen to subscribe to the Islamist ideology.

And there is more: We are trying to establish a regime based on the national will. What if, in such a regime, the referendum becomes a force of habit... It is quite possible that, one day, a referendum might be held, the question being: "Should we become an Islamic republic?" In a country where 99 percent of the people are Muslims, and where a good majority fervently embraces religion, it is quite possible that the Turkish people might suddenly bring about a "Turco-Islamic republic."

All these may sound like pure fantasy. But our recent history is so full of surprises that it might be wise not to discount the element of truth in such scenarios altogether.

The question may be posed whether an hypothetical "Turco-Islamic republic" would be for the good or for the worse. Well, no one is in a position to offer prophecies about that...But we can examine the record of Islamic countries, particularly of those bound by the Sharia--those which are theocratic Muslim societies.

Those defending the notion of a theocratic state, in turn, might point to the record of our secular republic and query whether it had been one of singular success--in governance or education. Others might add: "What about the atheistic,

godless communist countries? Have they been really successful? Maybe, had they been theocratic states they might have been better off--more prosperous, happier."

In responding to such speculation one finds that the situation --in Islamic countries are not too appealing either. Of course, the dark regime in Iran is the saddest example... And despite their huge wealth, the system is fundamentally flawed and unjust in countries like Saudi Arabia, Libya and Kuwait. Pakistan, which prides itself for being an "Islamic republic," is still in a heart-rending condition.

Religious circles may also put forward convincing arguments in response: "Until recently, these countries had been colonies of Western imperialism. Or, as was the case in Iran, they were under an even worse regime. For Islamist countries to be successful, and for them to release themselves from the heavy burden of the past, much more time would need to pass." They might also add that "there are many instances--Arab, Mongol and Ottoman empires to name a few--which demonstrate that states based on Islamist principles are quite capable of being successful in political, economic, and cultural fields."

Those interested in establishing theocratic states do point out those instances. And they are quite right. But, those old Islamic empires are now gone. And there is little likelihood, now or in the future, that similar Islamic states could be established. One may also point out that the Ottoman state, particularly at the zenith of its power, was hardly a typical Muslim state.

Leaving these arguments and claims aside, let us assume, just for the sake of discussion, that a "Turco-Islamic republic" has been founded. It might be interesting to speculate what kind of Turkey might emerge as a result, and what such a Turkey would bring to us: It would bring the Sharia, to start with. Sharia might have been acceptable in former times but objectively speaking, it cannot be implemented in today's Turkey.

In most Islamic countries, punishments like public flogging, cutting arms and legs, or executing those engaging in sexual relations are no longer applied. But, in Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and some other countries, such methods are sometimes used. We may conceivably go that route as well.

Our women's rights legislation, which may be viewed as a model not only for the Islamic world but many countries in the world, would be promptly abolished. Turban, chador and veil would be declared obligatory, the political and social rights of women would be shelved, women would be left without

education, they would be denied jobs, their property and inheritance rights would be reduced to a minimum, and they would be relegated, once again, to the status of second-class citizens, even to that of slaves. Iran has been moving in that direction. Perhaps, we might do the same in the name of Islam. Family planning and birth control, which are essential to our development, would be banned--due to a misinterpretation of religion.

The new regime would not simply dwell on the notion of "sanctity" but reinforce the notion of "fate" as well. "Submission to one's fate" may well be a laudable spiritual value, but notions of pre-determination and kismet have led many a Muslim society into fatalism and apathy. Thus, we may be justified in feeling an apprehension that, instead of having a strong grip on one's destiny (which a progressive Turkey needs), an Islamist order might create a passive and resigned society.

Certain members of the ulama, not really doing justice to Islam, had issued a fatwa [binding religious opinion] a thousand years ago that "the gates of innovation have been closed." Today, in Iran, Saudi Arabia or Pakistan, any new idea, any criticism concerning the religious tradition is considered a crime, or, at the very least, branded as sin. (leaving aside the so-called "religious revolution"). Islam is a great religion but if governments which interpret it happen to be reactionary, if bigots are holding power, then it becomes closed to new ideas, new technologies, and modernization in general. And if we choose that path we would be retrogressing as well--for the sake of a theocratic state.

The losses incurred by Turkey, in adopting a theocratic state structure, would be phenomenal. So, therefore, I invite you--those of you who pin their hopes on a theocracy--to continue living in the spiritual climate of your faith and fulfill any and all of your religious obligations. But, please, do not try to force Turkey, by means of internal or external pressures, into dubious adventures. We should all be respectful of everyone else's religious orientation. But, it is always better for the Turkish nation to keep religion out of politics and governance of the state. It is also to the good of religion itself that we avoid tainting it by politics.

12466

NEGOTIATOR'S VIEWPOINT ON U.S. BASES EXISTENCE

35210001 Athens PONDIKI in Greek 11 Sep 87 p 10

/Article by Adm Khristos Lymberis: "Bases and Dependence"/

/Text/ In our previous issue we published an important document on the bases issue, namely the recommendations made by five of the prime minister's advisers on this issue in view of negotiations dealing with the 1983 agreement. All five (Kapsis, Kouris, Makhairitsas, Lymberis and Andrikos) agreed on the general view that the bases are not useful to us--"to the contrary, one could say with relative certainty that some of the bases' activities, especially the collection of intelligence information, directly threaten our national defense interests and our foreign relations, while at the same time, from a political and social standpoint, they harm the goals of our more general national policy."

Today, we publish yet another text having exceptional significance, namely the special recommendation made by Adm Khristos Lymberis, the only one of the five mentioned above who is on the current three-member committee dealing with negotiations with the United States.

Consequently, his position and views have a direct relationship with the present situation:

How did the present negotiator view the issue at the time?

Besides, Lymberis is an officer--and his "view" differs: He presents the picture in a different fashion from that, for example, of a politician or a diplomat.

The title of his recommendation is "Brief Evaluation of the Problem of the American Bases in Greece."

The text that follows is the first part of the recommendation. The second and final part (with conclusions and proposals) will be published in the next issue.

1. Situation. There are four major American bases and communications nodes in Greece as well as a number of military facilities.

The primary mission of the bases is the support of American national defense objectives in the region of the Warsaw Pact countries and elsewhere (Middle East, Indian Ocean and North Africa).

NATO objectives are served in an indirect manner.

One would have to acknowledge with great reservation (if not with certainty) the serving of Greek national defense objectives directly served by the operations and activities of the bases.

The status of the American bases is governed by the 1953 agreements supplemented by more specific ones on a case by case basis (for example, the Souda air base and the 1959 agreement. As for the Nea Makri base, there is no special agreement). The problem put forward for further evaluation appears in the form of questions that follow:

First of all, are the American bases in Greece indispensable for serving Greek objectives as a free national option or is it a matter of a forced compromise of limited duration?

Secondly, what are the minimum Greek aspirations to be satisfied by a Greek-American defense cooperation agreement?

Thirdly, what model of agreement framework should be selected in case of the bases' operating in Greece?

2. Premises. (a) That the present international politico-military situation in the neighboring regions of Greece will continue to exist; (b) that Greece will not be self-sufficient in defense industries by the end of the 1980's; and (c) that Greece will remain a full member of NATO.

3. Factors. The following factors influence the problem: (a) Greek national defense needs; (b) NATO obligations; (c) American national defense objectives; (d) Greek public opinion; and (e) defense cooperation agreements between the United States and other NATO countries in the Mediterranean.

4. Analysis of factors. (a) National defense--Greek national defense needs.

(1) Our defense policy (or national defense policy) in general terms, as inferred from statements put forth each time by the Greek Government is as follows: Greece gives priority to confronting the national threat that is for the present and for many years to come expected to be Turkey. (Within NATO's framework, Greece cooperates with its allies in confronting the active ambitions of the Warsaw Pact, while it has as its strategic goal the elimination of the two defense agreements of Europe. Within this context it permits the operation of the American bases in our country).

(2) Policy on national defense (method of operation for neutralizing foreign opponents) is planned within the context of a more general national policy that covers a broader spectrum of domestic and foreign objectives and goals. The Greek Government, as that of every country, has proclaimed broader national goals, while a national strategy has been shaped that is manifested by sector, as foreign policy, economic policy, trade policy, defense policy, etc.

(3) From the above facts it becomes evident that (a) the definition of our national policy must take precedence, in other words the more general strategic options of the country should take precedence before we make any selection with regard to our defense policy and (b) the issue of the bases must be examined in correlation with defense policy and foreign policy.

(4) In determining its national policy Greece must pinpoint its national interests and formulate a policy for protecting them. Our national interest has two major dimensions: First of all, the domestic one. Here, we seek our social, economic, educational, industrial, technological, political and cultural development as well as the promotion of the democratic system of government. Secondly, the foreign one. Here, we seek equal cooperation in the Balkan, Mediterranean and European areas regardless of political systems, within the framework of the principles of the United Nations and other multilateral agreements. We are for the implementation of international principles of law, peace and respect of the national independence of peoples.

(5) We, therefore, must concentrate our attention on the following relationships and options (perhaps not the only ones):

(a) To what extent do the American bases in Greece serve our domestic and foreign national goals?

(b) Do other options for supporting our national goals exist?

(c) What will be the effect (positive or negative) from a limited or complete disengagement from NATO and bases supports?

(d) To what extent are we presently dependent on the above supports as far as national defense is concerned?

(6) We have become accustomed to NATO and the bases and our position must be based on the lessons of past experience and on prospects for developments for at least the next decade. We must not decide on the basis of what would happen to us without bases and without NATO. The national interest prescribes that we think and evaluate what is good for us in view of promoting our own national goals. National defense needs are determined by the national threat that at present is represented by Turkey above all. (Greek foreign policy to strengthen the formulation of national defense policy is necessarily influenced by the network of relations with the EEC, NATO and the more general bilateral relations and commitments of Greece). To confront the national threat Greece needs a strong defense. The present level of the Greek defense industry does not permit a unilateral dependence of our defense needs on it. Nor does the situation for the Greek defense industry appear to be productive enough in the 1980's that would make us self-sufficient. The development of the Greek war industry is necessarily limited by existing technology, capital, available technical and scientific personnel and the competitive aspect of goods on the market in and out of NATO. Greek defense needs are not only of a developmental nature but are needs for the operation and maintenance of existing materiel in the Greek armed forces. A great percentage of the available defense materiel at the disposal of the Greek armed forces is of American origin (for example, F-4, A-7 and C-130 aircraft, tank landing craft, electronic materiel, etc.) and there is need for its

being maintained and modernized. A great percentage of FMS loans goes toward the operational expenses of the armed forces. Consequently, the question is raised: "Will the operation of American bases in Greece be linked, and to what extent, with the availability and operation of major and secondary defense materiel from the United States and more generally speaking with the support of the development of the Greek defense industry?"

Experience up to now would rather say yes. It is this toughest and most obvious form of our dependence that strikes at our pride but that is the way things are. Our independence in such dependency is limited to the extent we are dependent from a defense standpoint by the low developmental level of our national defense industry, by the conduct of our other supply sources, by the possibility of a manifestation of some enemy action, by unforeseen international developments and by the amount of sacrifice the Greek people are prepared to accept for defense.

Our national independence goal is unfortunately undergoing trials and tribulations before which we must stand firmly and courageously. Of course, we must look at the spectacle of our defense dependency in its overall dimension, from the supply of all types of materiel, the training sources, etc. We must also be concerned over how it is possible for the United States to support us in confronting the national threat when it happens that Turkey is a NATO country (just as Greece is) with particularly friendly treatment from the United States. The following eventualities on the United States' position on the future of the bases are possible:

First of all, the United States will seek the prevention of any clash between Greece and Turkey by contributing, through political, economic and defense actions, to a relative balance of forces between the two countries.

Secondly, the United States will strengthen Turkey defensively by covering broader defense and strategic goals in the Middle East region without maintaining the principle of the balance of forces between the two countries, supporting political solutions between them through dialogue. Disengagement from the principle of the balance of forces with an attempt to maintain the bases with limited concessions and satisfaction given on the Cyprus issue.

Thirdly, the United States will withdraw their bases from Greece in case no agreement is reached on disengagement and thus from an equal balanced interventionism between the two countries. Reliance on other bases and on the strength of the Sixth Fleet.

The correlation of our national defense needs with the continuation of the operation of American bases in Greece presupposes that questions such as the following will have been cleared up:

(a) "What is the immediate national defense benefit from the activities and operations of the bases?"

(b) "What is the defense benefit from the existence of the bases alone?"

The answer to these questions is directly answered by our experience of many years and is as follows: the contribution of the bases operations to our

purely national defense objectives, within the context of a national threat, ranges from limited to negative. As much as Greece benefits from the presence of an American war vessel in Greek territorial waters it similarly benefits from the operation of the American bases as they are currently functioning. However, the existence of the bases, as a particular factor, contributes to the defense effort in accordance with the political, economic and military concessions that would be achieved within the context of an agreement.

The key, therefore, is to be found in our succeeding in these multifaceted concessions while at the same time every negative repercussion from the operation of the bases will be lessened. Nevertheless, we should not forget that in accordance with the 1975 constitution, Article 28, Paragraph 3, for an agreement limiting our national sovereignty--as a result of the operation of a foreign base--to be justified, the following--according to my personal opinion--must occur:

- (a) It must be dictated by national interest.
- (b) Human rights must not be harmed.
- (c) The democratic form of government must not be harmed.
- (d) It must be made on the basis of equality.
- (e) It must be made on the condition of reciprocity.

After all of the above, the following partial conclusion is deduced:

Since as long as the American bases, as they operate at present, contribute very little to confront the national threat, a renewal of their operation must be tied to a broader appreciation of the national interest in which is included a possible different form of behavior on the part of the United States, otherwise our dependence will not lessen.

The conclusion in the next issue.

5671

STRANGE JAMMING OF AIR FORCE AIRCRAFT REPORTED

Athens ELEVETHEROTYPIA in Greek 5 Aug 87 p 38

[Text] Strange electronic interference affecting Air Force aircraft while on a mission to intercept Turkish fighters within our air space have caused considerable unrest in the Air Force General Staff and in the political leadership of the Defense Ministry.

According to reliable sources the jamming, whose origin is not yet known, appeared at the time the Greek fighters were at the point of engaging the Turkish aircraft. The jamming resulted in neutralizing all contact with the fighters and all contacts of the pilots with surface radar stations.

According to the Defense Ministry the interception took place last Tuesday at 1630 hours in an air space northwest of Lesbos, when five formations of Turkish fighters violated our air space at various points and penetrated even inside the six-mile zone.

As soon as the jamming was reported to the Air Force General Staff--and in view of the fact that such jamming can take place from land, air or sea--information was sought from every ship or plane found in the area.

The same sources say that at the time of the jamming a Soviet airplane was flying in the area but this does not mean it did the jamming. The same sources say that the authorities examine the possibility that the jamming may have been caused by the N. Mauri [American] base or an AWAC in Aktion.

7520

CSO: 3521/0182

ELECTRONIC WARFARE DEVICES PURCHASE, AIRCRAFT PARTS ORDER

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 29 Aug 87 p 2

[Text] By decision of Deputy Premier and Defense Minister I. Kharalambopoulos negotiations will start for procurement of a number of electronic counter-measure devices for our frontier units. The cost is estimated at 2.5 million dollars and will be paid with FMS loans.

A relevant announcement by the Defense Ministry states that, as is done in such types of procurement, an effort will be made to realize the highest offset benefits.

The Air Force General Staff assigned to the General Mechanical Company, a subsidiary of the Greek Arms Industry, the construction of outboard fuel tanks for the F-16 C/D's within the context of the plan for the new fighter aircraft. The funds earmarked for this project reach three billion drachmas. The order was signed by Deputy Minister of Defense Th. Stathis.

It is noted that Stathis had announced that delivery of the F-16's will start in October 1988 and that the first six planes will arrive here in January 1989. To reduce the cost of the "package", the Air Force signed directly commercial contracts. The total of all contracts will reach 940 million dollars. The crews will be trained in the United States. Six Greek pilots will be trained at first and then they will train the rest.

New Democracy deputies Balkos, Manos, Papadongonas, Panourgias and Stathopoulos noted in a question submitted to Parliament for the minister of defense that the development of the Artemis 30 anti-aircraft system by the Greek Arms Industry is far behind schedule, while several problems exist concerning the system's functioning.

More specifically, the minister is asked to give reasons for the delay, to state if efforts were made by the Greek Arms Industry [EVO] to check in time problems of its development, and what were the reasons which dictated the signing of a new contract for production and procurement of an anti-aircraft system which is not fully developed and, most importantly, which is not acceptable to the branches of the Armed Forces, on behalf of which EVO has assumed specific contractual obligations.

For their question, the ND deputies state that "the national defense minister is requested to give the Chamber of Deputies copies of the Artemis 30 contracts, progress reports, and testing and evaluation reports."

OFFSETS BENEFITS POLICY DISCUSSED IN LIGHT OF TANKS AGREEMENT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 21 Aug 87 p 10

[Article by Nikos Khasapopoulos]

[Text] Deputy Industry Minister G. Petsos discussed with Bouazar, the president of Stayer-Austria, questions relating to the implementation of the agreement between the Greek Vehicle Industry [EL.V.O] with Stayer-Austria for the procurement of battle armored vehicles on the basis of offset benefits.

Yesterday the deputy minister said that in his meeting with Bouazar he spoke of the philosophy of offset benefits' policy. He said in part that:

--The offset benefits must result in a net improvement in the balance of trade. This means that products exported as offsets must have maximum added value.

--The offset benefits must promote the country's industrial and technological development and not distort indirectly its industrial production.

This means that exported products: (a) should be specific and should refer to sectors with prestablished industrial policy; (b) should lead to technological and industrial development; and (c) should promote conditions of mass production to achieve the desired competitiveness.

Moreover, the time for implementation of the agreements for offset benefits must allow for the absorption of know how and the gradual increase of the domestic added value which is the main criterion for the new improvement of the balance of trade.

Finally, the agreements must be tied to guarantees between governments.

"These above principles," Petsos added, "will determine the framework within which will move from now on our policy on offsets and the framework within which we will try to exert pressure on our suppliers in order to strengthen in a practical manner our industrial and small business production."

NAVY TO ACQUIRE MORE SHIPS, RENOVATION STUDIED

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 21 Aug 87 p 14

[Article by Nikos Khasapopoulos: "The Navy is Being Modernized"]

[Text] The program for modernization of the Greek Navy has been finalized and the recommendation of the military commission has been forwarded to the Government Council for National Defense [KYSEA] which will decide in one of its upcoming meetings on construction of new vessels and modernization of older ones in order to meet Greece's defense needs at sea even beyond the year 2000.

TO VIMA is informed that the program provides for frigates, destroyers, submarines, and auxiliary vessels. Navy officials regard this program as "the largest in the last 25 years." The commission, which was set up by KYSEA 3 years ago, was headed by Vice Admirals Bakopoulos and Asimakopoulos. It submitted its recommendation to Deputy Minister Stathis last May and Deputy Premier and Defense Minister Kharalambopoulos who approved it.

Now Stathis will present it to KYSEA which, however, may reach a decision outside the commission's recommendation (for various reasons), or ask for a new recommendation, as it did in the case of aircraft when the recommendation was for American F-16's only, but KYSEA decided to split the order and thus buy French Mirage 2000's also.

Premier A. Papandreou may speak on modernization of our Navy next Wednesday during ceremonies for the Athenian Trireme. The following data are known to TO VIMA and may be made public.

The program focuses on construction of four modern frigates. Of the many proposals presented to the Defense Ministry, the military commission selected four types--the American Todd, the Italian Lupo of the Fricatieri Company, the British Leander made by the Vosper Company, and the West German Mekto made by the Blud Und Foss. KYSEA will select one or two types and their construction will start immediately in Greek shipyards.

The proposed frigates have a displacement of 2,000 tons each and the same kind of armaments which include one or two helicopters of naval cooperation, surface-to-surface and sea-to-air anti-missile systems, Harpoon and Penguin missiles and sophisticated radar systems. The total cost for construction

of the frigates is estimated at 130 billion drachmas, excluding the cost of the helicopters. In any event, the fire power of all four types is extremely great and the frigates are especially suited for closed seas like the Aegean.

Today the Greek Navy has only two frigates, Limnos and Elli, both constructed in 1973-74 by Dutch shipyards.

In addition to the aforementioned four types of frigates, proposals were received for smaller frigates from Belgium, the Netherlands and Britain, which submitted a proposal for the mini-frigate Giaro.

The military commission does not rule out the procurement of smaller frigates to meet certain special needs of the Navy. Naturally these purchases will depend on offset benefits.

The second part of the program refers to the construction of two high-speed boats and five troop carriers. The two high-speed boats will carry modern guns and Harpoon and Penguin missiles, and their construction has already started in Greek shipyards with British technology. The five troop carriers are of Greek design and specifications and are also being constructed in Greek shipyards.

The Greek Navy has also signed contracts with the Greek Shipyards for construction of a number of auxiliary vessels--barges, water carriers, oil tankers and small LST's and for some construction has already begun.

With regard to the destroyers, modernization work started more than a year ago. Already 13 destroyers of the Fram class (Themistoclis and Koundouriotis and others) have been delivered, while modernization of the remaining is to be completed in September. The destroyers were equipped with Otomelara guns, Harpoon missiles, and helicopter ramps for servicing one or two helicopters. As soon as modernization of the Fram destroyers is completed, similar work will begin on other destroyers of the so-called "wild beasts" class, such as Panther, Lion, etc.

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CSO: 3521/0182

NAVY PLANS FOR NEW SHIP CONSTRUCTION

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 28 Aug 87 pp 2, 8

[Article by Nikos Gerakaris: "Four New Frigates Being Added to our National Fleet"]

[Text] Four new frigates similar to those we already have (Elli and Limnos) will be added to our Navy's forces. Deputy Premier and Defense Minister I. Kharalambopoulos stated yesterday that the process is in the final stage. He also spoke of the armaments program for the Navy in its entirety (new and projected construction of naval ships, modernization and renovation of old units of various types of vessels, etc.).

Side by side with the armaments program, procurement of a large number of helicopters, mainly for the needs of the Armed Forces, is moving ahead. The cost is expected to be considerable. It is noted specifically that according to military observers, the program for procurement of helicopters is behind schedule if one takes into account Turkey's ambitious program for strengthening its Navy.

Referring to the frigates, Kharalambopoulos said: "The process for selecting the type of frigates we want is now in the final stage. The various proposals are already being evaluated. Of the four frigates, three will be built in Greece. The first, which will serve as a "pilot project," will be constructed abroad. Payment will be financed with FMS funds. (This means that it will be of American make, whether the type selected is from the United States or not.) The total amount to be paid through FMS will reach 900 million dollars."

According to Kharalambopoulos, the following are under construction:

--Five troop carriers in Greek shipyards, construction of which started last April. The first vessel will be delivered in 1988 and the program will be completed in April 1990. Total cost: 30 billion drachmas.

--Five oil barges. Construction started in August 1986 at the Elefsis Shipyards and will be completed next year. Contracted cost: 180 million drachmas.

--Two oil tankers. Construction started last March at the Greek Shipyards and expected to finish in June 1988. Contractual cost: 1,174 million drachmas.

--A floating dock. Construction started last March at the Elefsis Shipyards. The new dry dock will have a lifting capacity of 6,000 tons. Construction will be completed in December 1988. Contractual cost: 1,900 million drachmas.

--Two modern patrol boats. The contract with Danish shipyards for supply of designs and materials was signed last month. Construction will start at the Greek Shipyards this year. Estimated cost: 3.5 billion drachmas.

--A water tanker of 1,200 tons capacity. Construction started at the Khalkis Shipyards and will be completed at the NAFSI installations. Contractual cost: 400 million drachmas.

Bids have already been solicited for construction of a hydrographic vessel. The contract award will take place before the end of 1987. Construction will take 12 months. Estimated cost: 250 million drachmas.

Modernization and Repairs

Another sector of the Navy armaments program deals with modernization and renovation. In this sector:

--Refitting of the destroyers Themistocles and Miaoulis has been completed.

--Installation of improved weapons systems on three destroyers is under way. Modernization of one destroyer is completed. The program will be completed in 1988. The cost will reach 3.5 million drachmas.

--The Navy General Staff now has under study modernization of electronic equipment and weapons for destroyers, 4 submarines, 4 torpedo boats, and 10 mine sweepers of American make.

In the sector of repairs there are plans for general repairs of destroyers and torpedo boats at the Greek Shipyards and NAFSI.

With regard to procurement of helicopters for the needs of the Armed Forces, Kharalambopoulos said "we are now studying the question of buying the same type of helicopters to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and a decision will be reached soon." He added, "the idea of having a single type of this craft is based on the objective of reducing the cost of operating the helicopters and achieving, of course, the maximum participation of the Greek industry in programs of joint production and offset benefits. Standardization cannot include all claims, but most of them. We will study the market to see how we can maximize Greek participation.

Similar requests have been presented or are to be presented by other ministries for purchase of helicopters. For example, the Ministry of Health (transportation of patients) and the Ministries of Agriculture, Northern Greece, etc.

Dutch F-5's

Kharalambopoulos explained also the purchase from the Netherlands of used F-5's or aircraft similar to those now being used by our Air Force and added: "A long time ago we initiated contacts with the Netherlands and Greek officers went there to study the matter which is currently under consideration. During the recent visit by the Dutch deputy minister of defense a "package" of defense cooperation issues was discussed, including the question of frigates and aircraft. The Dutch expressed interest in placing some test orders in Greece for their Army, but no agreement has been reached as yet."

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CSO: 3521/0185

BRIEFS

AIRCRAFT TO BE PURCHASED FROM THE NETHERLANDS--The Dutch Ministry of Defense in The Hague announced today that Greece will purchase F-5 fighters from the Netherlands. According to a ministry spokesman, the first aircraft will be delivered to Greece before the end of the year. The Dutch spokesman did not disclose, however, the exact number of aircraft to be delivered, nor the procurement price. According to Dutch Deputy Minister of Defense Jran Van Howlinge [transliteration] interest for the purchase of the F-5's has also been expressed by Turkey and some Latin American countries. The Dutch deputy minister added that during the talks he had with his counterpart, Theodore Stathis, the possibility of the purchase of six frigates by Greece from Holland was discussed. [Text] [Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 25 Aug 87 p 1] 7520

CSO: 3521/0185

STRAUSS ON BAVARIA, AEROSPACE, ARMS EXPORTS, DISARMAMENT

Bonn WEHRTECHNIK in German Jul 87 pp 16-29

[Interview with Bavarian Minister President Franz Josef Strauss, date and place not given: "Disarmament Is Justifiable Only if it Increases Our Security and Strengths the Peace"]

[Text] WT [WEHRTECHNIK]: During the postwar years, Bavaria has changed from a predominantly agricultural area to become the center of the German high technology industry, and its attractiveness for locating new enterprises remains undiminished. To what do you attribute this remarkable change in orientation of your state?

Franz Josef Strauss: During the postwar decades Bavaria turned into a modern industrial state which today, along with Baden-Wuerttemberg, is the FRG's primary industrial center. We have succeeded in overcoming the special obstacles which faced Bavaria after the war, and to adapt to the difficulties arising from Bavaria's peripheral location. Remember that Bavaria alone had to accept and provide a new home for 2 million out of the 8 million refugees and displaced persons. We do of course realize that particularly the refugees and displaced persons who initially constituted a heavy burden, considering monetary reform and the evolution of our economy from a controlled economy to a social market economy, turned into a moving force for economic recovery. Their industriousness, their capabilities, their undiminished courage and their political discipline made them participants in the "german miracle." Without them, the FRG and especially Bavaria would have been unable to break ground to become the number one economic power in Europe and for making Bavaria into a leading industrial center.

The Bavarian state government has never hesitated to do its utmost to promote this development. We set the appropriate planning dates, provided public funds and thus improved market conditions without thereby impairing the market. Especially, we used the Bavarian middle class support law and its ancillary programs to strengthen our medium-size craft and service enterprises and thus provided the base for a modern industrial state in which the technologies of the future could flourish. We encouraged the establishment of new plants--especially in the structurally disadvantaged border areas--and we are today enjoying the fruit of these organizational policy measures.

Compared with other German states, Bavaria today enjoys above-average economic growth and below-average unemployment. These successes are no reason for us to relax; rather, they constitute a stimulus and encouragement to continue on course. Our eventual goal is to make Bavaria into one of the most modern of European Regions. This requires above all that science and research obtain the facilities which they require to let this state and its citizens participate in new technological developments and progress. Oberpfaffenhofen, for instance, is to become a center for European space travel. Nuernberg is to become a technology center, Schweinfurt a center for applied microelectronics and Amberg a focal point for plastics technology. In late 1986 the "Center for Applied Microelectronics" was opened in Burghausen. This unique example of cooperation between the free state of Bavaria, the economy, the institutes of higher learning and the city of Burghausen will result in a still greater capability of the Bavarian technical universities for realizing their technological potential in behalf of the economy. New professorships at our universities and colleges will enable Bavaria to take the lead in genetics, biotechnology and marine sciences, in addition to maintaining its front rank in aerospace.

WT: What financial and motivational resources are at your disposal for supporting science, research and modern technologies in your state? How do you think your state is different from other federal states in this respect?

Franz Josef Strauss: Along with many others, you seem to believe that we can use enormous amounts of money to motivate German and foreign firms to locate in Bavaria. We are not buying scientists, nor research projects, nor industrial enterprises for Bavaria.

Rather, we have always attempted to create the most favorable conditions possible for science and research, for entrepreneurial activity and for entrepreneurial risk. That is what has made Bavaria attractive. Heinz Nixdorf, the computer pioneer who died much too young, gave three main reasons for choosing his location on the occasion of opening his Munich plant: the Bavarian educational system, good transportation links and political stability. Other enterprises decided to locate in Bavaria for the same reasons. Our politics have always been directed toward a free and open market economy. That is what makes us different from some other German states.

The German Aircraft Industry Reestablished

WT: In this context, what are the roles of the aerospace industry and the defense industry?

Franz Josef Strauss: After the war Bavaria became the center of the German aerospace industry. This of course caused the electric and electronics industry, computer and communications technologies and other forward-looking areas of endeavor to settle in Bavaria also.

Even during the years of reconstruction, the Bavarian state government made conscious efforts to give preferential treatment to this non-smokestack industry and, as events have proven, thus made a correct decision. Today about 50 percent of German aerospace capacity is located in Bavaria. I am not indulging in subliminal advertising by mentioning in this context such names as MBB, Dornier, MAN, Siemens, Rohde & Schwarz, and the German Research and Testing Institute for Aviation and Space Travel. I should also mention the Max-Planck-Society with its research facilities for physics and astrophysics in Munich-Garching, the Munich Technical University, which is highly renowned in the aerospace field, as well as the universities of Erlangen, Nuernberg, Wuerzburg, Bayreuth and Regensburg with their specialized concentration on physics, computer sciences, material and plastics sciences and biological sciences.

After a long pause, decreed by the victorious powers, the aerospace industry has during the last few years once again become world class. By virtue of its enlightened economic policy, Bavaria has created the basic prerequisites for today's technological and economic status of our aerospace industry and will continue to do everything in its power which is required to solidify and further enhance this position. We are after all concerned that future generations will find modern work and training opportunities which hold promise for the future. As federal minister of defense, I rebuilt the German aircraft industry and thereby created opportunities for the civil aviation industry also. We proceeded in a systematic manner. Initially, we succeeded in producing the required engineering capabilities and the technological and scientific potential by way of maintenance, assembly and construction under license of U.S. aircraft, and thereafter to build up our own efficient aerospace industry which today is in the forefront of achievement--starting with the TORNADO, by way of SPACELAB and ARIANE all the way to the AIRBUS.

The whole world agrees that our aerospace enterprises are not only building civil aviation aircraft but that they also develop and construct aerial vehicles dedicated to maintaining our defense capability.

No Political Morality--Only Hypocrisy and Cowardice

WT: The German defense industry largely depends on Bundeswehr contracts, whose procurement cycles barely provide a continuous work flow for individual firms. Also, Bundeswehr financial resources are not likely to increase over the long term; in fact the opposite may be true. Could this not produce a change in the defense industry: a retreat from the "insecure" weapons business, and one which in addition is increasingly under attack by the public, toward a more civilian orientation, resulting in a longer-term negative impact on the quality of Bundeswehr equipment? Or is this to be balanced by increasing exports of defense materiel?

Franz Josef Strauss: I am not aware of the existence of a single enterprise in the FRG which is solely dependent upon military production. A reasonable management policy requires that a firm be a supplier of several types of

customers insofar as possible. Just as Daimler-Benz now produces more than just automobiles, other enterprises too have secured their positions through diversification into other types of marketable products. The firms concerned, as well as I, have long been aware of the fact that several major military contracts have expired or will expire during the next few years, without any prospects for renewal.

This situation constitutes a challenge primarily to the firms, but also to the Federal Government. After all, maintaining these industrial capabilities is a part of our defense capacity. Arms manufacturers have for a long time made efforts to export their products within the confines of the law. I consider it not only absurd, but also hypocritical, if the FRG is prevented from selling TORNADOs to Saudi Arabia, while the British partner of this joint project sells this weapon system to the Saudis. We are of course participating in the construction of this aircraft as subcontractors of the British, and are building 40 percent of the airframe for the Saudis. But we are excluded from selling the necessary electronic equipment and weapon systems, as well as from the construction of infrastructure installations. This is not political morality, but hypocrisy and cowardice, with grave disadvantages for legitimate German interests. Arms exports consistent with our national and international interests enhance our defense capabilities by virtue of higher production numbers, thus contributing to a reduction in our defense budget. The greater the production, the cheaper the unit price.

In addition, I wish to emphasize that export of military materiel to friendly or allied nations is highly beneficial to German interests. It is in fact a contribution to securing world peace, if the receiving countries undertake a moderating or stabilizing function within their respective regions.

It saddens me therefore that my promising efforts to secure a major Saudi contract for eight or more submarines, involving facility construction worth DM8 billion, were stifled by behind-the-scenes machinations of German diplomacy and the well-known timidity of the people in Bonn, and that this important contract will probably go to France. If you consider the fact that the work potential of major German firms, including that of two shipyards, is missing out on this contract, while at the same time subsidies worth billions of marks for the threatened German economy are being negotiated in Bonn under the heading "Reduction in Subsidies," it becomes clear that this is a totally uncoordinated effort.

The following guidelines should be made to apply to arms exports:

1. Job security;
2. Full use of research and production potential;
3. Plant construction in foreign countries;
4. Securing our sources of raw materials;
5. Preservation of political influence for the benefit of our security and peace policies.

WT: After the elections it was said that you would make the Federal Government's arms export policies into a subject for debate within the coalition, along with the policies concerning South Africa/Namibia. The latter is being debated; what happened to arms export policy?

Franz Josef Strauss: I have publicly stated on several occasions that no efforts would be made to change existing guidelines for the export of defense materiel (which were in effect laid down by the liberal-socialist administration on 28 April 1982), and that they would therefore not be a subject for coalition debate. What is necessary, I said, is merely their application in equality with the Western NATO partners and with legitimate German interests in mind.

While during the last coalition talks the question of arms exports and the South Africa/Namibia problem were on the agenda, insufficient time was available for dealing with them. The problem of the "zero option" occupied almost the entire time available. However, these items were merely postponed, not cancelled.

Four Principles for Arms Exports

WT: You are frequently reproached for your constant public support for German arms export. For the benefit of our readers, would you once again explain your attitude in this matter: should any country, even if it is involved in warfare, be able to import no matter what from Germany, or would you advocate any restrictions as to countries and the types of armaments to be furnished?

Franz Josef Strauss: My political allies and I have never, explicitly or otherwise, advocated an unrestricted and wide-open export of military materiel. It is true that we are in favor of a structured arms export policy which would benefit German interests and world stability. For this reason, we should support our friends throughout the world. In the specific case involving Saudi Arabia, we are dealing with German policy involving a moderate Arab state whose stability has great significance for the Near and Middle East and which, in my opinion, would not run counter to Israel's vital interest but would in fact be beneficial to them. Critics of this policy would benefit from reflecting on how untenable Israel's strategic situation would become if after an Iraqi defeat the Saudi Kingdom and other Gulf states were replaced by Islamic republics similar to that of Iran. It would therefore be in our own best interest to provide that country and others with the means of preserving order.

In my opinion, the export of German defense materiel should be guided by four important principles:

--The sale of defense materiel to friendly nations constitutes an important contribution to maintaining the development and production capacity of our industry for our own defense capability.

--Tied to the foregoing are job availability and security or the creation of additional jobs in technology areas with future potential. It would be the height of naivete to think that where the export of defense materiel is concerned this would involve only defense industry jobs. Improperly applied guidelines for arms exports have an impact on thousands of jobs beyond their own domain. Additionally, in the aerospace industry for example, there must be a greater number of contracts if capabilities are to be evenly utilized.

--We must exert political influence upon the clients in the interest of security and peace. Israel for instance had no objection to our obtaining a maintenance contract for the Egyptian Air Force.

--Almost every modern weapon system requires an extensive infrastructure. If for instance submarines were to be furnished, this would entail follow-on contracts for the construction of harbors and other facilities, which our hard-pressed shipyards on the German coast need badly. For this reason, and by request of the Federal Chancellor and the Minister of Defense, I was of course glad to support the sale of eight German vessels to Saudi Arabia during my talks in Ryadh in November 1986. Billion-mark contracts of this nature have been lost to us in the past and threaten to be lost in the future, because the application of rules for arms exports in non-NATO states differs from their application by other comparable European partner states. France has no shipyard crisis, because it orients its export policy to its vital interests in word and deed.

Forty-two years after the end of World War II we should be able to act like any normal state which has not only the right, but the duty to act according to its own interests. In view of recent controversies during the visit of the Israeli President I should like to clarify matters once again: the special responsibility borne by the German people toward the state of Israel and its citizens does not relieve us of the task of independent thinking about Israel and its problems and to make our own decisions on how we can contribute to a peace based on justice in that region. Unlike my critics, I have proven my support for Israel long ago by deeds, rather than merely words. As Federal minister of defense, I took high personal risks in furnishing the state of Israel with vitally needed defense materiel in what was probably the most dangerous phase of its history. My personal friendship with then-Israeli defense minister and now foreign minister Peres dates from those days.

AIRBUS Must Be Capable of Timely Delivery of Market-Appropriate Aircraft Types

WT: You are making exemplary efforts on behalf of the European AIRBUS family. However, there are doubts as to its future. Diminishing dollar earnings, which do not permit repayment of old loans are added to new capital requirements for completing the AIRBUS line. Can the industry involved be expected to assume greater financial responsibility than it has in the past?

Franz Josef Strauss: The AIRBUS A-340 and the AIRBUS A-330 must be developed and built, as had been their predecessors, the A-300, A-310 and A-320. The A-340 is a large-size, long-distance aircraft with 270 seats and four engines, designed for a 12,000km range. The A-330 is a second-generation AIRBUS, i.e., a large size aircraft with two engines, which could be considered a successor to the B-2, B-4 and the A-300-600.

In my capacity as chairman of the supervisory board of the German Airbus GmbH and of Airbus-Industries, I have strongly impressed upon all participating governments, particularly the present German government, that the AIRBUS project can be pursued and continued in an effective manner only if two prerequisites are met:

--Airbus must be able to guarantee to all its customers and potential clients that this enterprise will still be in existence 5, 10 or 20 years from now in competition with the U.S. aircraft industry, especially Boeing.

--At the proper time, Airbus must be in a position to offer the types of aircraft required by the market at competitive prices.

In the absence of these prerequisites, AIRBUS should never have been started, or else terminated long ago. No airline in the world is prepared to order an aircraft, no matter how excellent, if there is reason to believe that 5 or 10 years hence the manufacturer will no longer be in business or that he will be unable to make timely delivery of market-oriented aircraft types. For those reasons, there is no choice now but that the participating governments and the participating industry must come up with the development costs which are needed at this moment.

Bavaria Would Be Prepared To Reduce its MBB Share

WT: In the context of AIRBUS, there is talk that the state is to withdraw from MBB, thus enabling other German industrial enterprises to obtain participation in MBB. How do you feel about these proposals? Would Bavaria be prepared to reduce its direct and indirect participation, and if so, to what extent? What firms would you prefer to participate in MBB?

Franz Josef Strauss: Until now, industry has not been ready to take over after any retreat by the state, as proposed by the theoreticians. I would be very much in favor if a renowned major German enterprise, be it Siemens, BMW or Daimler-Benz, were to assume a major impact on MBB through increased managerial guidance with concomitant financial commitments. However, from a number of conversations I am aware of the fact that such a solution has to date been hindered not only by AIRBUS's old debts and risks, but also by the refusal to assume financial risks in other aerospace industry projects. This constitutes a challenge to the FRG government to subsidize old debts, reduce risks and establish a 12 to 15-year medium-term civilian and military program and thus to create a point of departure which would motivate one of

the enterprises concerned toward committing itself to significant participation. The Free State of Bavaria would certainly be willing to reduce its share in MBB if that were to come to pass.

Desirable: Orderliness in Helicopter Capabilities

WT: The major aerospace and defense industry programs are all based on bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Nevertheless, there is an increasing impression that under the cover of cooperation, national vested interests are being pursued. Might this problem be solved with the creation of multinational firms, such as a European helicopter manufacturer?

Franz Josef Strauss: It is quite natural and permissible that despite cooperation which transcends national borders, national interests are not abandoned. However, divergent interests must already be resolved in the so-called definition phase of a joint venture. This may entail delays, but it also may work out very well, as was the case with the successful cooperative projects of the AIRBUS and the TORNADO. Inasmuch as today neither major military nor civilian aerospace projects can any longer be undertaken by one nation exclusively, because this would overtax the financial and technological resources of an enterprise or a country, and because until the present there is no European legal commercial code, because no one has dared to broach this subject, we have to depend upon the present form of cooperation.

In view of worldwide excess capacity in civilian helicopter production it would have been desirable to sort this out, at least within Europe. Last year there was a good opportunity for this with Westland. A European consortium consisting of Aerospatiale, Agusta, British Aerospace, General Electric and MBB submitted an acceptable recapitalization proposal to Westland stockholders. Unfortunately this offer was defeated by Westland management and by a political campaign which led to the resignation of British Minister of Defense Heseltine. In the end, the stockholders approved the UTC/Fiat proposal. A great opportunity was lost in this manner.

HERMES and COLUMBUS Can Be Funded

WT: We have discussed the billions of marks needed for enlarging the AIRBUS program. Space programs such as HERMES, COLUMBUS, ARIANE 5 also require large amounts of money; the same is true for developing new weapons. How is all that to be funded during the next 10 years, especially in view of tax reforms which will cause the state to lose considerable revenue?

Franz Josef Strauss: The main features of tax reform agreed to in the coalition provide for a DM25 billion drop in the 1990's. Personally, I would have preferred a net reduction of DM45 billion, without compensation from other sources, if only for cyclical considerations. In view of its moderate and intelligent budget and fiscal policies, Bavaria could have managed this and could have absorbed the drop in tax revenues accruing to Bavaria. However, in view of the difficult federal budget situation and

especially because of the hopeless financial situation in several other states, a total drop in revenues of DM45 billion was not feasible.

But even a net tax revenue reduction of DM25 billion can be financed only by observing strict expenditure discipline and by a temporarily greater new net debt. The Federal Minister of finance has already indicated that he wants to limit the increase in annual expenditures to 2.5 percent--the budget committee of the CDU/CSU Bundestag fraction even proposes a limit of 1.7 percent--and that the net new debt for 1990 would increase to slightly more than DM30 billion. However, as early as 1991 the net new debt would start to decrease, because tax reform would by then create a refinancing effect. The large-scale tax reductions benefiting individuals and enterprises in 1988 and after 1990 will generate boom impulses which will result in more economic growth, will create more work and will therefore create more tax revenue. This is the so-called "self-feeding effect" which results from any enduring tax reduction. The tax reform of the 1990's will therefore not lead to significant revenue losses to the state. Such ambitious space projects as HERMES and COLUMBUS can therefore be funded. We must indeed do this, since particularly in aerospace new technological ground is being broken. If we are not a part of this, we would as an industrial nation gamble away our own future within a short time.

We Need a German NASA

WT: Contrary to the practice in such countries as France, the FRG does not have a long-term concept for research and technology. As we see it, things are done in a more haphazard way; day-to-day politics appear to be given more importance than long-range planning. Would it not be appropriate, especially in view of the financial problems, to show some initiative, inasmuch as our economic well-being requires considerable efforts in R&T?

Franz Josef Strauss: A restructuring of the past system of research support is one of the new FRG government's program points. During the liberal-socialist coalition direct support to research was favored. Individual projects were accepted into support programs with enormous bureaucratic efforts and with an army of official project monitors. Here we have changed course toward indirect support and have initiated a retreat of the state from market-oriented research. The German Economic Institute in Cologne confirms that we have chosen the proper course. Its calculations indicate that private and public funds for R&D in the FRG between 1983 and 1985 have increased by DM9.4 billion, an increase of 20 percent, to DM55.6 billion. Thus 2.8 percent of the German GNP are spent on R&D. This brings the FRG even with the United States, which also devotes 2.8 percent of its GNP to R&D and ahead of Japan, which spends only 2.6 percent. Improved governmental attitudes, a more favorable research climate and especially indirect means of support have contributed to the fact that the German economy is not resting on its laurels but remains innovative. It is interesting in this context also that the institute has found that almost 50 percent of the German economy's research potential is concentrated within

the states of Baden-Wuerttemberg (24 percent) and Bavaria (23 percent). This fact also answers your earlier question of why Bavaria developed from an agricultural state to a high-technology center after the war.

On the other hand, it is quite true that France has set conceptual points of emphasis, particularly in the aerospace field. I have repeatedly emphasized my opinion that the organization of German space efforts must be improved. We need a German NASA. In view of our constitutional situation, I have therefore proposed the establishment of a German Aviation and Space Ministry and have repeatedly asked the Federal Chancellor finally to create an institution which would be capable of preparing space policy decisions for the Federal government in an expert manner and which then could then speedily implement them.

Just recently I told the Federal Chancellor once again: with space travel, we are on the threshold of opening up outer space for scientific purposes. While other countries, even such developing countries as India, are undertaking national efforts to achieve the best possible starting position at the gate to the universe, the conquest of space is barely understood in the FRG to be a separate political goal which must be achieved. We are already clearly lagging behind France and Great Britain today.

Participation in future developments in space travel and technology is a sine qua non for the existence of the FRG. Space travel means technology leadership which provides new impulses for other industries as well.

France, the Netherlands, Sweden, Great Britain, Norway, and even Japan and India have a central institution devoted to the elaboration and implementation of a national space program. But we have no such facility. Responsibilities are widely scattered. There is no effective coordination of the various efforts. For our foreign partners we do not have a competent spokesman responsible for all aspects of a space program.

It is therefore urgently necessary:

--that the FRG establish a supra-agency and binding national space program and provide appropriate funds therefore in the budget;

--that a national space agency be established which would participate in the elaboration of a space program on a supra-agency basis and which would also implement it. Such an independent space agency would combine total responsibility for space activities of all federal ministries as to planning and implementation.

It should be staffed by experts from industry and research; at its head should be a renowned space expert who would be capable of imparting new impulses to the Federal government's space policy.

Disarmament Is Not a Goal in Itself

WT: For the moment--and probably for some time to come--nuclear disarmament has been topic number one. Why is the West leaving the image-building initiative to Gorbachev and does not itself propose specific disarmament programs, nor elucidate the eventual objective of balanced forces? How would you define such an objective; what would such equality look like, in the conventional and nuclear sector?

Franz Josef Strauss: Once again our state is faced with the groundless accusation that anyone who does not consider Eastern and Western disarmament proposals to be compatible with FRG interests is ipso facto an enemy of disarmament. But disarmament is not an end in itself. It is justifiable only if it enhances our security and strengthens the peace. There must therefore be no opportunism in dealing with the disarmament question from either an ideological nor a party politics aspect. What is needed is a capacity for thinking in terms of realistic, global and strategic contexts.

This is the exact question at the core of present discussions about the correct way for preserving peace and freedom. In view of the Warsaw Pact's overwhelming superiority in conventional and chemical weapons there is no possibility for the West to maintain a credible deterrence with a peace-keeping effect without the availability of nuclear weapons. However, an agreement between the two superpowers on a so-called double-zero solution (zero for medium-range missiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,500km as well as for shorter ranges of 500 to 1,000km) would mean that for the 0-500km range, the 88 NATO systems would be faced with 1,350 Warsaw Pact systems. Of these, NATO would have all the systems in the 0-150km range, but the 150 to 500km systems would all be Soviet. In advocating the double-zero solution, the Americans demand a massive buildup in the 150 to 500km range.

Disarmament must not permit the other side to think that wars in Europe are once again predictable, feasible and winnable. Otherwise it could even conjure up the nightmare of a war which could be fought with limited risk--meaning, all-German risk.

A look at the map tells us that after a double-zero solution more than 80 percent of the remaining short-range missiles are aimed at targets on German soil on both sides of the inner-German border. They would be sufficient to make Germany into a desert, even after a double-zero solution. Such a special threat is not compatible with the justifiable security interests of the FRG. During the discussions about NATO rearming, we have always maintained that Western Europe must not become a limited security zone. Now we are faced with an outcome which for us would be even more dangerous--that our country would become the single theater of a nuclear confrontation.

For this reason it is necessary that special German interests, which are not necessarily identical with those of the United States, must be introduced

with special emphasis into the disarmament dialog of the superpowers, to avoid our being faced with the necessity for yet another buildup of short-range weapons, at which the United States has already hinted and which would have to be located on German territory exclusively in view of the ranges concerned. This would not only impose an unacceptable special risk to the FRG; the West would thereby undermine the defense community of free peoples by creating zones with varying levels of security. We cannot expect the other NATO partners to give greater emphasis to German security interests than we do ourselves, least of all, if their nuclear threat is eliminated in that manner and if they can thus eliminate internal political pressures, as was the case in Great Britain prior to their elections.

It is not our job to diminish the horrors of war, but rather to prevent its occurrence in the first place. I am firmly convinced that what is needed for this purpose, pending a breakthrough into yet another technological dimension, is for NATO to have at its disposal nuclear weapons with ranges from 500 to 1,000km so as to maintain a credible deterrent to preserve the peace. We are satisfied with very low upper limits for this. Just what these limits would be depends upon the USSR's readiness to reduce its enormous superiority in the areas of conventional and chemical weapons. The Soviet Union has not been heard from in this matter to date.

There Will Be a Federation of European States

WT: Your name has been mentioned in connection with initiatives toward the creation of a European nuclear force. By abandoning nuclear cooperation with France and Great Britain, would Germany become isolated and lose political, and thereby perhaps also economic influence?

WT: It is a well-known fact that the FRG has dispensed with ownership of nuclear weapons and that it neither has, nor desires, authority to use nuclear weapons. However, I predict that eventually there will be a federation of European states. Such a federation would have to be able to defend itself. Because of this, a European government would have to have at its disposal the same means of defending itself as do other powers. There is therefore no question about a separate German nuclear force. Any accusations against me of this type are based on either ignorance or libel.

To Create Equal Living Standards and Work Opportunities in All of Bavaria

WT: Let's go back to Bavaria once more. You too have not only the high-tech areas in the greater Munich and Nuernberg areas, but also some less favored areas. What action is the state government taking to produce some equality there?

Franz Josef Strauss: It is our goal to create equal living standards and work opportunities all over Bavaria. We do not want to concentrate our efforts only in the dense population areas, but develop all areas. Especially in all of the fringe areas for example we have a lot of catching

to do. Northern Bavaria for example is a center of regional structure policy of the Bavarian state government. That is why today Northern Bavaria has economic dynamics which are above the average for the FRG.

BMW is a good example of how we use specific subsidies as incentives for attracting industry and thus to decentralize single-location structures. BMW's Plant VI in Regensburg not only served as a stimulus to the construction industry in that area when it was being built, by helping it get over a down-cycle period; upon completion, it will also provide modern jobs for 3,500 employees. But what is even more important is the fact that BMW's Plant VI brought in several other industrial plants. So far an additional 13 subcontracting firms have located in the government districts of Lower Bavaria and the Upper Palatinate. Including the expansion activities of the established subcontractors, the employment policy effect of the BMW location has more than doubled in Regensburg.

In the future we will continue to make certain that the infrastructure in Bavaria will continue to expand, thus motivating industry to locate in low-structure areas as well. Bavaria's need to catch up in major highway construction was recognized in the 1985 Federal road construction program; it places almost all important Bavarian major highway construction plans into a category of urgency. Completion of the Main-Danube Canal, expected in 1992, will provide large areas of Bavaria with an efficient, environment-friendly and cost-effective transport route which will link Bavaria, Germany and many other European countries with Danube-border countries and the Black Sea.

Inauguration of the Munich II Airport in 1991 will make Munich into a gateway to the Near and Middle East and will directly connect all of Bavaria and our Austrian neighbors to the international lifeline.

We have further managed to have Bavaria connected to the express train routes of the German Federal Railways.

These transport improvements will provide a guarantee that our fringe and problem zones too will, in the literal sense of the word, have connections.

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EDITORIAL URGES RESTRAINT IN PURSUIT OF MANNED SPACE FLIGHT

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 17 Sept 87 p 1

[Editorial by Guenter Paul: "Europe in Space"]

[Text] With the successful flight of the Ariane rocket, the long hiatus in space travel has come to an end in the West. For 15 months, European satellites and space probes had to remain on the ground unused. For far too long, no carrier system was available for flights into space. It is a success for the Europeans that new confidence can be placed in the reliability of the Ariane.

This, however, should not lead one to paint a rosy picture of the future of European space travel. The European Space Agency, ESA, and the most important member countries want to see European astronauts fly in a European shuttle (Hermes), carried by a yet to be developed rocket (Ariane 5), to the European section (Columbus) of an American space station, in order to prove the capability of European technology in space. But they are aiming too high. The development of the U.S. manned space program was a gradual process. Large projects were tackled one at a time, not all at once. And despite this more moderate tempo, scientific space projects had to be scaled back in favor of the manned project due to cost considerations.

But the Europeans did not want to draw a lesson from all of this. The earlier successes of the Ariane, which will hopefully resume now with yesterday's successful takeoff, and the daring feat of the European Spacelab-D1-mission on board the American space shuttle directed from Oberpfaffenhofen seem to have blinded them to the dangers of over-eagerness. They want everything at once.

In the process, however, the long-term goal of the Ariane 5, Hermes and Columbus projects--to achieve a large degree of autonomy in space--has receded into the distance. The Hermes program has already had to be scaled back considerably. The ambitious project, which was hailed as a multi-purpose space (shuttle) a few months earlier, has since been reduced to a space vehicle which can, at best, transport two or three astronauts and smaller loads. In the future, as well, if the Europeans want to transport larger components into space, they will have to ask the Americans for assistance. The decision, criticized at times, to push ahead with preliminary studies for Hermes with larger financial outlays, was correct. This, at least has made it evident that not all of the French planners' ideas can be realized.

Final agreement has not yet been reached concerning the right of co-determination of the Europeans on board the planned space station. The negotiations with the Americans are protracted and laborious. No real progress was made at the round of talks held last week. Europeans no longer believe that an agreement can be reached by mid-November, as the Americans want. The Americans view the space station as an object of national prestige. NASA needs to carry out a project for which it assumes responsibility in order to burnish its public image. For them, it is a matter of getting back on their feet following the Challenger disaster which had the effect of a second Sputnik shock in the United States.

Aside from the technical difficulties and the political squabbles, the projected cost of a European manned space flight has risen dramatically in the past months. When the number of billions contributed by the Germans was still a single digit figure, the Minister for Research and Technology Riesenhuber defended his budget, saying, he could not trim the sum because other areas of research would suffer. In doing so, he encountered opposition from the Finance Minister. Now, since the anticipated German share of the ESA's cost totals 18 billion, Riesenhuber's enthusiasm has probably been dampened somewhat although he still supports this plan publicly. It is still not known where the necessary money will be obtained; the only certainty is that the conflicts are becoming sharper than they were a few months ago. Whether the ESA Council of Ministers can reach a definite decision about the space projects in November is more than questionable, given the national differences of opinion which exist not only in the FRG.

Industry may regret this. The large firms within the space industry naturally hope for a quick and affirmative decision. In this way, jobs could be saved and new ones created. Less thought is given to the more distant future. Following the conclusion of the development phase which is now beginning, new projects could be called for--again with an allusion to creating jobs. If governments were to pursue this path, other important research projects would be threatened far into the future as resources became committed. In the United States, NASA managed to come up with new tasks for its laboratories in the same way.

However one looks at it: European politicians would be well advised to pursue the path towards manned space flight at a slower pace. In this way, they could consider things more carefully and plan more thoroughly in the future.

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EEC REPORT ON EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT STATISTICS

Athens I VRADYNI in Greek 22 Aug 87 p 16

[Text] According to an EEC Statistical Service report, Greece has the highest unemployment percentage among its young people of up to 26 years of age--24 percent--while the rest of the West European countries have a substantially smaller percentage. Overall unemployment in Greece is 8 percent.

The same report reveals that Greek civil servants work fewer hours in a week than their counterparts in the other 11 EEC countries. They work 39 hours per week while the Germans work 41 hours, the Dutch 39.5 hours, and the British 42 hours.

By contrast, Greek workers hold the record in work hours per week with an average of 44 hours (compared to the EEC average of 39.5 hours). More analytically:

In agriculture they work 48.8 hours per week (EEC: 48 hours); in industry 42 hours (EEC: 40.3 hours); in services 42.9 hours (EEC: 39.1).

The report shows that in Greece about 1,039,000 persons work in agriculture; 291,000 in industry, and 1,629,000 in services. The number of unemployed was 304,000 persons or 7.8 percent of the economically active population. Among the young people in the 14-to-18-age bracket unemployment was 23.9 percent.

The report places Greece's non-economically active population at 3,794,000 persons (1,139,000 men and 2,655,000 women) and the numbers of those employed on a part-time basis at 189,000 persons. Of the total population of 9,656,000 the number of children under 14 years of age is 1,969,000 or 20.4 percent--the highest percentage among EEC countries except Ireland (20 percent).

Wage and Salary Earners

The total number of employers and self-employed is 1,290,000 (1,046,000 men, 244,000 women) while that of wage and salary earners is 1,770,000 (1,210,000 men and 560,000 women). Agriculture employs 1,037,000 persons, industry, 921,000 and services, 1,629,000 persons (45.4 percent of the total).

Of the 1,290,000 self-employed or employers, 597,000 work in agriculture, 216,000 in industry and 447,000 in services, while of the 1,770,000 wage and salary earners, 42,000 work in agriculture, 670,000 in industry, and 1,058,000 in services.

The number of those employed by their own families totals 528,000 persons. Of these, 398,000 work in agriculture, 35,000 in industry, and 95,000 in services.

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